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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE 
OF PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over various final judgments 
of the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County, State of Utah 
("Trial Court"), all pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals. Those judgments are: 
(a) A Trial Court summary judgment in favor of 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. ("Respondent") and against the 
Appellants, Real West, Inc. ("Real West"), Chas E. Bryan, and 
Paul D. Graff, which summary judgment fully dismissed the 
counterclaim of those Appellants in Trial Court Civil No. 9489; 
and 
(b) A Trial Court summary judgment in favor of 
Respondent and against the Appellant, Real West, which summary 
judgment dismissed the complaint and amended complaint of Real 
West in Trial Court Civil No. 10782, except for one claim 
involving a small escrow account. 
Each of the summary judgments described above was a final 
order. 
Appendices which briefly describe the specific claims 
asserted against Respondent by these Appellants, the rulings of 
the Trial Court on each of those claims, Respondents affirmative 
defenses relevant to its respective summary judgment motions, and 
the Trial Cort rulings on those affirmative defenses are appended 
to this Brief as Appendix "A" (Trial Court Civil No., 9489) and 
Appendix "B" (Trial Court Civil No. 10782). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Should This Court Presume the Correctness of the 
Trial Court Judgments Where Appellants Have Failed to Make Proper 
Citations to the Record in Their Statement of Facts and References 
to the Proceedings Below? 
2. Should Those Rulings of the Trial Court Which Were 
Not Challenged by Appellants in Their Brief Remain Undisturbed? 
3. Where the Appellants Have Failed to Specifically 
Identify Disputed, Material Issues of Fact Which Allegedly Exist 
in These Cases, Should the Trial Court Summary Judgments Be 
Affirmed? 
In the event the Court inquires into issues not properly 
raised in Appellants' Brief, the following additional issues are 
presented for review. 
4. Have the Appellants Failed to Rebut the Presumption 
and Clear Evidence that the Foreclosure Sale Relevant to These 
Suits Was Properly Conducted? Pursuant to Concepts, Inc., Is a 
Sale Valid Notwithstanding a Typographical Misdescription of One 
Subparcel Of the Real Property? 
5. Were the Water Rights Relevant to These Cases 
Appurtenant to the Real Property Sold to Respondent at the 
Trustee's Sale? And Did Those Water Rights Pass to Respondent by 
Trustee's Deed? 
6. Should the Appellant's Conversion Claim Be Dismissed 
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Since Neither Real Property Nor Water Rights Evidenced by a Water 
User's Claim Can be Converted? 
7. Does Real West's Failure to Pay Its Note at Maturity, 
Its Failure to Object to the Sale After It Knew of the Minor 
Misdescription in the Notice of Sale, and Its Delay in Bringing 
Suit Until After Rights of Third Persons Came Into Existence All 
Bar Any Equitable Claim of Real West Against Respondent? 
8. Did the Appellants Fail to Properly Raise Their 
Breach of Covenant of Good Faith Claims? In Any Event, Do 
Essential Elements for Such a Claim Fail for Lack of Proof? And 
Are the Terms of the Purported Oral Contract at Variance with 
Those of the Written Contract Between the Appellants and 
Respondent? 
9. Have the Appellants Real West and Bryan Split Their 
Claims? 
10- Do the Appellants Bryan and/or Graff Have Individual 
Standing to Assert Damages or Claims Which, if They Exist at All, 
Would Belong to Real West? 
11. Should Appellants' Fraud Claim in Trial Court Civil 
No. 9489 Be Dismissed Because There Is No Proof of Essential 
Elements Necessary to Sustain a Claim of Fraud? 
12. Did the Trial Court Properly Find that the 
Appellants in Trial Court Civil No. 9489 Failed to Properly Plead 
or Prove Essential Elements of Their Claims Sounding in Misuse of 
Process, Wrongful Interference with Sale, and Fraud in 
Transferring Title to Water Rights? 
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UTAH STATUTES RELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL 
Sections 70A-1-201(19) and 1-203 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, are each relevant to the Appellants1 
attempted breach of covenant of good faith claims. These sections 
are fully cited on page 5 in the Respondent's brief in the 
companion Auto West, Bryan, and ULCC case. 
The provisions of Sections 57-1-23 through 57-1-28 are 
relevant to this appeal on issues pertaining to the sale of the 
subject real property and water rights. However, this Court is 
not requested to interpret those statutes anew. Recent 
interpretations of those sections by this Court and/or the Utah 
Supreme Court are indicative of present law and dispose of issues 
raised on appeal. 
This Court is requested to interpret the following 
statutes or portions of statutes relevant to this appeal: 
(a) Section 73-1-10 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
Conveyance of water rights — Deed •— 
Exceptions — Filing and recordation of deed. 
Water rights, whether evidenced by decrees, by 
certificates of appropriation, by diligence 
claims to the use of surface or underground water 
or by water users' claims filed in general 
determination proceedings, shall be transferred 
by deed in substantially the same manner as real 
estate, except when they are represented by 
shares of stock in a corporation, in which case 
water shall not be deemed to be appurtenant to 
the land; and such deeds shall be recorded in 
books kept for that purpose in the office of the 
recorder of the county where the place of: 
diversion of the water from its natural channel 
is situated and in the county where the water is 
applied. A certified copy of such deed, or other 
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instrument, transferring such water rights shall 
be promptly transmitted by the county recorder to 
the state engineer for filing. Every deed of a 
water right so recorded shall, from the time of 
filing the same with the recorder for record, 
impart notice to all persons of the contents 
thereof and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and 
lien holders shall be deemed to purchase and take 
with notice thereof. 
(b) Section 73-1-11 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
Appurtenant waters — Use as passing under 
conveyance. A right to the use of water 
appurtenant to land shall pass to the grantee of 
such land, and, in cases where such right has 
been exercised in irrigating different parcels of 
land at different times, such right shall pass to 
the grantee of any parcel of land on which such 
right was exercised next preceding the time of 
the execution of any conveyance thereof; subject, 
however, in all cases to payment by the grantee 
in any such conveyance of all amounts unpaid on 
any assessment then due upon any such right; 
provided, that any such right to the use of 
water, or any part thereof, may be reserved by 
the grantor in any such conveyance by making such 
reservation in express terms in such conveyance, 
or it may be separately conveyed. 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND OF FACTS 
I. STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Appellants* counterclaim in Civil No. 9489 and their 
amended complaint in Trial Court Civil No. 10782 assert a series 
of lender liability claims against Respondent. The Trial Court 
granted in full Respondent's motion for summary judgment and 
dismissed the Appellants entire counterclaim in Civil No. 9489. 
The Trial Court also granted Respondent's motion for summary 
judgment in Civil No. 10782 and dismissed Real West's amended 
complaint except for one small claim involving an escrow account. 
Both rulings constituted final judgments. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 31, 1979, Real West signed a $60,000 note 
("Note") in favor of Respondent. The Note had a one year term and 
matured on December 31, 1980 (R-2763 at 92, Ex "I"). 1 
2. The Note was secured by a second trust deed ("Trust 
Deed") covering various parcels of real property (some parcels had 
been sold and the lien released prior to the foreclosure sale of 
the property). The real property was located in Iron County, Utah 
(R-1623). Respondent already held the prior and first trust deed 
on the property (R-2763 at 75). 
3. The Trust Deed relevant to this appeal gave 
Respondent a lien on the real property and also on " . . . all 
. . . rents, profits, . . . water rights, and appurtenances of 
every kind and nature thereto belonging." (R-2780 at 75, 2763 
Ex "H"). 
4. According to the records of the State Water Engineer, 
the water rights relevant to this lawsuit2 are appurtenant to 
one of the parcels described in the Trust Deed (R-701 at 67). See 
generally testimony of Area Water Engineer at R-2759 at 10-12. 
*Where a citation to the official record of the Trial Court 
contains an R, immediately followed by numbers (i..e. R-1679), the 
reference is to the Record in Trial Court Civil No. 9299 (the 
original case in these consolidated proceedings) and to the 
specific page in that file where the evidence appears. Where, 
however, the citation contains an R followed by a designation 
#9478, #9489, #10597 or #10782, the reference is to one of the 
specific consolidated cases other than No. 9299 and to the page in 
that particular file where the cited evidence is to be found. 
2The water rights are evidenced by a water user's claim and 
not by stock certificates. 
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Those records show that the point of diversion and place of use of 
the water rights are situated on the subject property (R-701 at 
63). Those records also show ten artesian wells located on the 
property (R-701 at 61-62). There is no evidence that the water 
rights in question are appurtenant to any other property. The 
water on the property was beneficially used for irrigation and 
stock watering purposes during the 1975-1980 period when Real West 
owned the real property (R-2754 at 14, 17-18). 
5. According to loan related documents essentially 
contemporaneous with the date of the Note and Trust Deed, the 
source of the Note repayment was M. . . the sale of [Real West's 
investment] properties in the amount of $150,000 . . . ." 
(R-2754 at 48-50, Ex "10"). The payment source was not to be a 
long term loan from Respondent to Auto West (R-2754 at 63-64). 
6. The Note matured on December 31, 1980 and was not 
paid at maturity (R-1624-1625) . The Note remained in continuous 
default from the date of maturity until the date of the sale. 
(Id. See also 2751 at 43). 
7. Nearly three quarters of a year after the Note had 
matured, Respondent instructed the trustee of the Trust Deed to 
commence nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings against the remaining 
real property which secured the Note (R-1624-1625). On or about 
September 16, 1981, the trustee filed a notice of default (R-2749 
Ex H6"). A copy of that notice was mailed to Real West in care of 
its authorized officer (R-#10782-648, 653). The notice of default 
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correctly identified all parcels which secured the Note as of the 
date of the notice of default. 
8. The Note was not fully repaid3 within the three-
month period as provided by Section 57-1-24, et_ seq. of the Utah 
Code Annotated. As a result, on December 16, 1981, the trustee 
filed a notice of sale (R-2749 Ex "8"). 
9. The notice of sale, including the notice of sale 
published in the newspaper, contained a typographical error which 
erroneously indicated that one of the three subparcels in Parcel 
Two was located in Section 2, rather than Section 20 (the "0" was 
inadvertently omitted as to the one subparcel). The legal 
description of Parcel Two in the notice of sale contained the 
three separate subdescriptions, each describing what should have 
been contiguous subparcels in the total parcel. Only the third 
subdescription contained the typographical error (R-2749 at 
29-31). The other two subparcels were correctly identified as 
situate in Section 20. .Id. The Notice of Sale specifically 
referred to the recording information on the Trust Deed. Ld. A 
copy of the notice of sale was mailed to Real West, in care of its 
officer, by certified mail (R-#10782-648, 654-655). 
10. Appellants have not produced evidence that potential 
bidders or third persons were confused or misled by the 
Respondent did receive some money from Real West's sale of 
a small portion of the real property which secured the Note, but 
not enough to cure the default. 
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misdescription of the one subparcel. At neither the summary 
judgment hearing nor in their Brief submitted to this Court did 
Appellants ever identify any such third person. 
11. On or about January 12, 1982, the trustee sold the 
subject property (except for those portions of the original 
property which had been released earlier). Respondent was the 
successful sale bidder. Respondent's sale°bid was computed by 
subtracting from its most recent appraisal the unpaid balance 
remaining on an earlier note Real West owed to Respondent (which 
note was secured by the same property), plus costs and fees. The 
total amount of the unpaid principal on the earlier note plus the 
unpaid balance owed on the Note was greater than the appraised 
fair market value of the subject property (See R-1625-1626) . 
12. Neither Respondent nor the trustee disclosed the 
contents of the recent appraisal to any third person (R-1625). 
Nor did they hinder or interfere with any prospective or actual 
bidder either prior to or at the sale (R-1625). Appellants have 
been unable to identify any third person to whom the appraisal was 
purportedly shown or who was precluded, prevented, or dissuaded 
from bidding at or attending the sale (R-2771 at 100-101; 2782 at 
22-23). 
13. After the January 12, 1982 trustee's sale, the 
trustee delivered to Respondent a trustee's deed to the property 
(R-2749 at 22, Ex M 4 M ) . That trustee's deed contained the correct 
legal description of all of the subparcels sold and did not repeat 
the typographical error contained in the notice of sale. Id. 
14. At least one of Real West's officers was aware of 
the misdescription in the notice of sale near the time of the sale 
and discussed that misdescription with the trustee (R-2749 at 
31). Respondent was not aware of the misdescription of the 
subparcel until the Appellants1 amended complaint was filed on 
May 21, 1985 (R-1626). 
15. Having received the trustee's deed, Respondent 
assumed it had marketable fee title to both the real property, and 
to the water rights (R-1626). 
16. At no time after the trustee sale did Real West, or 
anyone on its behalf, tender to Respondent or to the trustee the 
unpaid balance on the Note (R-2751 at 43). 
17. Appellants Bryan and Graff signed a guaranty of Real 
West's Note (R-2780 at 103; 2765 at 23). Appellants Bryan and 
Graff were both corporate officers of Real West (R-2779 at 4; 2763 
at 9). The latter owned stock in Real West, while the former did 
not (R-2763 at 22; 2765 at 6). 
18. Real West claims it was induced to sign the Note 
because of a fraudulent representation by Respondent that it would 
make a long term loan to Auto West, Inc., a separate corporate 
entity which was neither a parent to nor a subsidiary of Real 
West. (See R-#9489-330; 2779 at 7.) Most of the purported 
representations to Real West occurred after the Note had already 
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been signed. (See R-#9489-331.) But even as to the 1979 
representations which Real West and the other Appellants claim 
were made, one of Real West's officers testified that Respondent's 
officer(s) intended at the time that the loan would be made to 
Auto West (R-2771 at 112-114). 
19. The purportedly promised loan to Auto West was 
always an event to occur in the future (R-#9489-330-331.) 
20. Appellants have produced no evidence nor do they 
refer to any evidence in their Brief to support any assertion that 
any pre-Note statement of Respondent's officers was made with a 
present intent to deceive.4 (And see R-2771 at 112-114.) 
21. There are no contemporaneous or any other written 
documents signed by or on behalf of Respondent which refer to any 
1979 commitment to grant long term financing to Auto West. 
22. In filing its notice of default and its complaint 
for a deficiency judgment against Real West on the Note and 
against Appellants Bryan and Graff on their guaranty, Respondent's 
only motivation was to avail itself of proper legal remedies used 
for their intended purposes, namely to foreclose upon secured 
collateral pledged for a past due debt and to collect the 
deficiency amount remaining when sale proceeds were insufficient 
to retire the debt. (R. 1627.) 
4The First Security officer who made the statement denies 
ever having made the commitment to make the loan which Auto West 
claims was promised it (R-2754 at 65). 
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23. Records of the Area Water Engineer identify 
Respondent as the owner of the water rights (R. 2759 at 13). 
Sandra McCall, an employee of the Area Water Engineer's Office, 
testified that she or her secretary wrote in Respondent's name as 
owner of the water rights and that the name of the earlier owner 
was crossed out. However, Respondent did not instruct her to make 
those changes. She made the changes based on the contents of 
official records in her office (R-2747 at 33-34,) 
24. Neither the Note, the Trust Deed, nor any other 
document relevant to the December 31, 1989 loan refers to any 
commitment of Respondent to make a long term loan to Auto West or 
to any loan to Auto West. Nor do any such documents indicate that 
a. loan to Auto West would be the repayment source for the Note. 
25. Appellants' counterclaim was filed on or about 
January 20, 1987 (R-#9489-323-335), and at a time when the real 
property (subject to reservation of some water rights) and certain 
other of the water rights had been sold to third persons 
(R-#9489-512-516, 517-521, 522-526). 
26. On June 13, 1988, the Trial Court entered its 
Memorandum Decision which fully dismissed Appellants' counterclaim 
in Trial Court Civil No. 9489 (R-2570). The amended complaint of 
Real West in Trial Court Civil No. 10782 was also dismissed except 
for a small claim involving an escrow account (R-2575). Final 
judgments effectuating the holdings in the Memorandum Decision 
were signed by the Trial Court judge on July 4, 1988 and docketed 
with that court on July 8, 1988 (R-#9489-542-543). 
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27. Nothing in Appellants' Brief mentions the Note, the 
Trust Deed, the real property, or the water rights relevant to 
either Trial Court Civil Nos. 9489 or 10782. Appellants' Brief 
does not identify or mention any error in conjunction with the 
foreclosure sale of the Real West real property or water rights. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. ARGUMENTS RELATING TO APPELLANTS' BRIEF. 
Appellants' Brief makes no mention whatever of any claim 
asserted by any of them in Trial Court Civil Nos. 9489 or 10782. 
No specific assignments of error are made by these Appellants as 
to any ruling of the Trial Court dealing with allegations 
contained in their with pleadings in Trial Court Civil Nos. 9489 
or 10782. Since the material issues relevant to Trial Court Civil 
Nos. 9489 and 10782 are ignored in Appellants' Brief, the Trial 
Court rulings in those cases should be affirmed. 
Appellants* Brief does not cite or identify pages in the 
official record to support any of the facts Appellants assert in 
their brief. As their brief fails to contain citations to the 
record, this Court should affirm the Trial Court judgments. 
Appellants fail to identify any specific material issue 
of fact which they claim constitute Trial Court error. Where 
Appellants have ignored issues adjudicated below or where 
Appellants have failed to identify as error any specific 
adjudication of the Trial Court, such ignored or uncontested 
rulings should be affirmed. 
An unsupported assertion that a triable issue of fact 
exists does not provide any basis for overturning a summary 
judgment. Allegations in pleadings which are unsupported by 
evidence do not create a material issue of fact. A court need not 
search an entire record in an attempt to aid a party who does not 
specifically identify what issues of material fact allegedly exist, 
II. ARGUMENTS RELATING TO MATERIAL ISSUES IN TRIAL COURT 
CIVIL NO. 10782. 
The essential theory pleaded by Appellants in Trial Court 
Civil No. 10782 is that the foreclosure sale of the Real West real 
property and water rights was defective and improper. However, 
Appellants* Brief never addresses that sale, nor does their brief 
even mention Real West's real property or water rights. 
Appellants fail to rebut the presumption and the evidence that the 
foreclosure sale was properly conducted. A minor misdescription 
of one subparcel in a contiguous parcel does not invalidate a 
foreclosure sale absent evidence of harm caused by the 
misdescription. The water rights (which were appurtenant to the 
real property) passed by trustee's deed to the Respondent. Real 
West's claims of conversion are improperly pleaded because neither 
real property nor water rights evidenced by a water user's claim 
can be converted. Real West's failure to pay its note and its 
delay to timely file legal action all bar any equitable claim to 
set aside the sale. 
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III. ARGUMENTS RELATING TO MATERIAL ISSUES IN TRIAL 
COURT CIVIL NO. 9489, 
Many of the issues asserted by Appellants in Trial Court 
Civil No. 9489 merely repeat allegations made by them in Civil 
No. 10782 and elsewhere. Such claims are barred by the doctrine 
of claim splitting. Claims in Civil No. 9489 that the sale was 
improper are unsupported by law or evidence. The claim of misuse 
of process is improperly pleaded and unsupported by the evidence. 
Appellants* Claim of fraud lacks proof of necessary 
elements. There is no evidence that Respondent ever had any 
intent to deceive. Nothing in Appellants' Brief describes any 
fraud by Respondent in matters relevant to Trial Court Civil 
No. 9489. As fraud is never presumed and no evidence supports 
essential elements of a fraud claim, the fraud claim asserted in 
Trial Court Civil No. 9489 should be dismissed. No evidence 
supports Appellants' assertion in Civil No. 9489 that Respondent 
fraudulently caused the State Water Engineer's Office to Transfer 
Title to the water rights. 
IV. ARGUMENTS RELATING TO APPELLANTS' CLAIM OF BREACH 
OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
Appellants failed to obtain an order permitting an 
amendment to assert a claim of breach of covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. In any event, the purported amendment by 
interlineation failed to give Respondent fair notice of the claims 
asserted against it. Written documents set out the clear terms of 
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agreements between Respondent, Real West, Bryan, and Graff. 
Alleged oral terms contrary to those in writing may not be 
asserted. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. APPELLANTS1 BRIEF EITHER IGNORES OR FAILS TO CONTEST 
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES ADJUDICATED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL 
NOS. 9489 AND 10782. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ERRORS IN 
APPELLANTS BRIEF REQUIRE AFFIRMANCE OF THE TRIAL COURT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS. 
A. The Appellants Brief, in Both Its Statement of Fact and 
Arguments, Ignores or Fails to Object to the Fundamental 
Rulings of the Trial Court on Issues Central to Civil 
Nos. 9489 and 10782. 
Appellants do not discuss the pleading issues relevant to 
either of the Real West cases in their Brief. The Brief never 
mentions the Note, the Trust Deed, the real property, the water 
rights, the foreclosure sale, or the allegations in the pleadings 
which are relevant to Trial Court Civil Nos. 9489 and 10782. 
Respondent recognizes that in order to prevent clear error and 
where compelling reasons exist, an appellate court may address an 
issue not raised in the briefs Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987). However, the general rule is that an appellate court 
will confine itself solely to issues raised by the parties on 
appeal. Moore v. American Coal Company, 737 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 
1987) . The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the 
consideration of an issue not raised by the parties is generally 
". . . ill-advised in the absence of a request from or briefing by 
the parties." Id. 
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The rules of this Court require an appellant in its brief 
to state "... the issues presented for review" (Rule 24(a)(5) and 
to provide "a statement of the facts relevant to the issues 
presented for review." (Rule 24(a)(7)) When a brief fails to 
address specific matter adjudicated by a lower court, omits or 
ignores an issue which it might have presented for review, and 
fails to state facts showing the error of the lower court, the 
failure to address such issues should be regarded as a waiver. 
See Tremblay v. Reid, 700 P.2d 391, 398 (Wyo. 1985); Woods v. 
Crouse, 101 Idaho 764, 620 P.2d 798, 799 (Idaho 1980). As the 
Supreme Court of our sister state noted: "Error is never presumed 
on appeal and the burden of showing it is on the party alleging 
it." Woods, supra, 620 P.2d at 799. Where the Appellants have 
not contested the specific findings and rulings of the Trial Court 
in Civil Nos. 9489 and 10782, those rulings should be affirmed. 
B. The Failure of the Appellants' Brief to Include Citation 
to the Trial Court Record Compels the Unrebutted 
Presumption that the Trial Court Rulings in Favor of 
Respondent Were all Correct. 
Respondent refers the Court to pages 20 through 22 of its 
Brief in the companion Auto West, ULCC and Bryan cases, in which 
it has outlined arguments and authorities on the above subheading. 
C. The Appellants Have Failed to Produce Evidence Necessary 
to Sustain Material Elements of Their Cases. Therefore, 
Summary Judgment Was Properly Ordered Against Them. 
Respondent refers the Court to pages 22 through 23 of its 
Brief in the companion Auto West, ULCC and Bryan cases, in which 
it has outlined arguments and authorities on the above subheading. 
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D. The Appellants Have Failed to Identify What Material 
Facts the Trial Court Overlooked in Granting Summary 
Judgment, This Court Need Not Search the Record for 
Material Facts Appellants Have Failed to Call to Its 
Attention. 
Respondent refers the Court to pages 23 through 24 of its 
Brief in the companion Auto West, ULCC and Bryan cases, in which 
it has outlined arguments and authorities on the above subheading. 
II. THE RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL NO. 10782 ARE FULLY 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, REAL WEST HAS FAILED TO ADDRESS, 
LET ALONE CONTEST, THE SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS IN 
THAT CASE. THEREFORE, SUCH RULINGS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 






led to Rebut 
Foreclosure 
the Presumption and 
Sale Was Properly 
the 
description of a Portion of One of the 
Parcels in the Notice 
Sale. 
In Concepts, ] !nc. v. 
\ of Sale Does Not Invalidate 
First Security Realty Serv., 
the 
743 
P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged 
the presumption in favor of the validity of a nonjudicial 
foreclosure sale. 
A party who seeks to have a trustee sale set 
aside for irregularity, want of notice, or fraud 
has the burden of proving his contention, it 
being presumed, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, that the sale was regular. [Citation 
omitted] Defects in the notice of foreclosure 
sale that will authorize the setting aside of the 
sale must be those that would have the effect of 
chilling the bidding and causing an inadequacy of 
price. [Citation omitted] The remedy of setting 
aside the sale will be applied only in cases 
which reach unjust extremes. [Citation omitted.] 
In Concepts, an erroneously printed sale date in the 
notice of sale did not justify setting aside the foreclosure 
sale. Substantial compliance with the statutory procedures of 
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Section 57-1-28, et: seq. of the Utah Code was sufficient. The 
Court held that even if a mistake had the potential to mislead, 
the sale should not be set aside absent evidence that someone 
actually had been misled. As the Concepts opinion observed: 
Defendant's statement that the incorrect date had 
the potential to mislead prospective bidders is 
insufficient to conclude that it in fact did. 
Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1160. 
In the case before this Court, Real West has not produced 
evidence showing that prospective purchasers were misled on 
account of the misdescription in the notice of sale. No affidavit 
of any such third person was submitted. The date for completion 
of discovery is past (R-2556). The other adjoining subparcels 
were all correctly identified as situate in Section 20. A buyer 
who was looking for a specific section number would have been 
alerted that something was amiss by the non-contiguous Section 2 
description of one subparcel surrounded by the remaining 
subparcels in Section 20. 
The notice of sale described the entry number and 
recording information of the Trust Deed. The Trust Deed's legal 
description did not contain the typographical error. Decisions in 
other jurisdictions have held that where a notice of sale contains 
a misdescription, but identifies the actual trust deed containing 
the correct description, the mistake in the notice of sale is not 
fatal. Guardian Depositors Corp. v. Keller, 286 Mich. 403, 282 
N.W. 194, 198 (1938). One of Real West's officers was aware of 
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the misdescription near the time of sale and discussed it with the 
trustee (R-2749 at 31). However, he made no objection to nor did 
he request any renoticing of the sale. Both the notice of default 
and the trustee's deed correctly described all portions of the 
subject parcel. 
As between themselves, Real West and the Respondent 
agreed that: 
The recitals in the [trustee's] deed of any matters of 
fact shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness 
thereof. 
(R-2763 at 101, Ex "J"). 
The trustee's deed which Respondent received after the 
sale stated: 
All applicable statutory provisions of the State 
of Utah and all of the provisions of said trust 
deed have been complied with as to acts to be 
performed and notices to be given. 
(R-2749 at 23, Ex "9"). 
There is an absence of any evidence to rebut the 
presumption that the trustee sale was regularly and properly 
conducted. The written agreement between Real West and Respondent 
was that trustee's deed recitals were to be conclusive proof of 
matters recited. Therefore, the decision of the Trial Court 
sustaining the sale should be affirmed. 
B. The Water Rights Relevant to this Case Were Appurtenant 
to the Real Property Sold to Respondent at the Trustee's 
Sale. Those Water Rights Passed by the Trustee's Deed to 
the Respondent. 
The water rights relevant to Real West's amended 
complaint are appurtenant to the real property conveyed to 
-20-
Respondent by the trustee's deed. The records of the State Water 
Engineer so indicate (R-2759 at 13). The point of the water's 
diversion is on that property (R-#10782-701 at 63). Artesian 
wells (R-#10782-701 at 61-62; R-2765 at 14-15; 2780 at 127-128) 
and a holding pond containing water (R-2765 at 14-15; 2780 at 
127-128) are located on the property. Water from the pond was 
used for irrigation and livestock watering purposes during the 
time Real West owned the property (R-2765 at 14, 17-18). There is 
no evidence that those water rights are appurtenant to any other 
property. 
The applicable legal principles are simple and largely 
governed by statute. The Trust Deed in favor of Respondent 
included both the land and " . . . water rights and appurtenances 
of any kind." (R-#10782-701 at 70-71; R-2765 Ex. "J".) However, 
even if the Trust Deed had not referred to the water rights, the 
Utah Code clearly provides: "A right to the use of water 
appurtenant to land shall pass to the grantee of such land 
. . . ." Section 73-1-11 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
The water rights were evidenced by a water users claim, 
not by water stock shares, and as such they would be ". . . 
transferred by deed in substantially the same manner as real 
estate ....'• Section 73-1-10. It was not necessary that the 
trustee's deed describe them. Since they were appurtenant to the 
real property and beneficially used on that property (e.g., R-2759 
at 9, 13; 2765 at 14, 17-18) they passed by the trustee's deed. 
Those water rights were not reserved by Real West in the Trust 
Deed nor were they reserved in the trustee's deed Respondent 
received from the trustee. See Section 73-1-11 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. The Utah Supreme Court has held that a mortgage 
in statutory form, without a specific reservation of the related 
water rights, conveys whatever rights the mortgagor has to the 
water rights appurtenant to that land. Thompson v. McKinney, 91 
Utah 89, 92-93, 63 P.2d 1056, 1058 (1937) (dealing with water 
rights represented by shares of stock before the 1943 statute 
governing the transfer of water stock). 
Since the water rights were appurtenant to the real 
property conveyed to Respondent by the trustee's deed, the water 
rights passed to Respondent even though the deed did not 
specifically mention them. See Section 73-1-11 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
C. No Conversion Occurred on Account of the Foreclosure Sale 
Since Neither Real Property Nor Water Rights Evidenced by 
a Water Users Claim Can Be Converted. 
In its amended complaint in Trial Court Civil No. 10782, 
Real West claims Respondent " . . . converted [Real West's] water 
rights . . . " (R-#10782-266) and that Respondent " . . . converted 
[Real West's] . . . real property. (Id. R-#10782-267) . Such 
claims are legally deficient as neither real property nor water 
rights evidenced by a water users claim can be converted. The 
general rule is that: 
. . . [R]eal property cannot be 'converted1 and 
there is no cause of action for conversion of 
real property. Conversion in the legal sense 
applies only to personal property. 
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Rowe v. Burrup, 95 Idaho 747, 518 P.2d 1386, 1389 (1974). See 
also 18 Am. Jur. 2d Conversion § 19, pp. 156-157 (1985). 
Echoing that general rule, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that conversion requires ". . .a wrongful exercise of 
control over personal property in violation of the rights of its 
owner . . . ." Frisco Joes', Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d 1327, 1330 
(Utah 1977) (citations omitted and emphasis added). See also 
General Leasing Co. v. Manivest Corp., 667 P.2d 596 (Utah 1983). 
Similarly, water rights evidenced by a water users claim 
cannot be the subject of a conversion action since such water 
rights are treated as an interest in real property. In the 
decision In Re Bear River Drainage Area, 2 Utah 2d 208, 271 P.2d 
846 (Utah 1954) this court wrote: 
The rights to the use of water . . . have 
been characterized ... as an interest in real 
property. . . . [Citation omitted] . . . the 
right itself is treated as an incorporeal 
hereditament and is real property. 
Id., 2 Utah 2d at 211, 271 P.2d at 848. See also Cortella v. Salt 
Lake City, 93 Utah 236, 247, 72 P.2d 630, 635 (Utah 1937) (the 
right to use water "is real property.").5 
sThe analysis is different when a plaintiff sues for 
stealing his irrigation water, rather than for claiming his water 
rights. See Cortella v. Salt Lake City, supra (distinguishing 
between "water as personal property" and "the right to the use of 
water"). The Utah Supreme Court implicitly recognized a tort 
action of conversion based on a claim that the defendant 
"intentionally stole [the] plaintiffs water." See Jennings v. 
Graham, 15 Utah 2d 205, 390 P.2d 123, 124 (1964). The Jennings 
decision, however, did not involve a claim to water rights, as 
does the instant case. 
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Even assuming that Real West has mischaracterized its 
remedy and seeks instead to quiet title, the undisputed sequence 
of: (a) language in the Trust Deed which specifically included 
water rights; (b) beneficial use of the water on the real 
property; (c) default; (d) recording of the notices of default and 
sale; (e) notices mailed to Real West; (f) substantial compliance 
of the notice documents with statutory requirements; (g) absence 
of evidence showing that third persons or the trustor were misled; 
(h) sale; and (i) the issuance of the trustee's deed all combine 
to fully quiet title in Respondent. As title to the land was 
quieted in favor of the Respondent, title to the appurtenant water 
rights was also (R-2749 at Ex "9"). The rulings of the Trial 
Court on these issues are fulLy supported by the evidence. No 
genuine issue of fact was raised by Real West on any of these 
issues. Nothing in the Appellants Brief contests any of them. 
The decision of the lower court should be affirmed. 
D. Real West's Failure bo Pay its Note at Maturity, its 
Failure to Object to the Sale After it Acquired Knowledge 
of the Minor Misdescription and its Delay in Bringing 
Suit Until After Rights of Third Persons Had Come into 
Existence all Bar any Equitable Claim of Real West 
Against Respondent. 
The Real West Note matured on December 31, 1980 (R-2780 
at 92, 2763 Ex "I"). The Note was in continuous default from its 
maturity date until the date of the foreclosure sale (R-1624). At 
no time after the sale did Real West tender to Respondent the 
unpaid balance owed on the Note (R-2751 at 43). Between the date 
of the sale and the date Real West filed its compLaint (it was 
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only in its amended complaint filed in May, 1985 that Real West 
first complained of the property misdescription), Respondent sold 
the various parcels of the subject property to third persons 
(R-#9489-512-516, 517-521, 522-526). 
The failure to tender the past due sums precludes 
Appellants' claim to set aside the foreclosure sale. 18 Am. Jur. 
2d Conversion § 83 p. 204 (1985) United States Cold Storage of 
California v. Great Western S. & L. Ass'n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 232, 238 
(Cal. App. 1985) (dictum). The delay in bringing suit until 
rights of third parties had attached to the property constitutes 
laches. 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 571, p. 676 (1971), 
particularly since Real West's own officer appears to have been 
aware of the misdescription of the one subparcel at or near the 
time of the sale (R-2749 at 31). 
A very recent decision of the Utah Supreme Court holds 
that a party who is in a position to object to an alleged 
irregularity in a foreclosure sale, but fails to timely do so, may 
be precluded from a subsequent objection based upon principles of 
waiver and estoppel. The court cited with approval part of 55 Am 
Jur 2d Mortgages § 861, p. 252 (1971) for the proposition: 
"... [A] mortgagor may by acquiescence and 
failure to assert his rights at the proper time 
be estopped to set up irregularites in the 
foreclosure proceedings to defeat rights of the 
purchaser..." 
American Falls Canal Securities Co. v. American Savings and Loan, 
109 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah 1989). 
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By failing to timely assert their claims of irregularity 
of notice after they acquired knowledge of the one subparcel 
misdescription, the Appellants are now estopped from doing so. 
III. THE RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL NO. 9489 ARE FULLY 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. SINCE APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO 
ADDRESS OR OBJECT TO SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND RULINGS OF THE 
TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL NO. 9489, THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
A. Appellants9 Claims in Trial Court Civil No. 9489 Largely 
Arise Out of the Same Transaction As Those Involved in 
Trial Court Civil No, 10782 and in Appellant Bryan's 
Damage Claims in Civil No. 9478. As a Result, Such 
Claims and Damages Are Prohibited By the Doctrine of 
Claim Splitting. 
In both its amended complaint in Trial Court Civil 
No. 10782 and in its counterclaim in Trial Court Civil No. 9489 
Real West asserts similar claims and damages allegedly caused by 
the 1982 foreclosure sale. Compare R-#10782 265, 269 with 
R-#9489-333-334. The only exception appears to be the fifth cause 
of action in the Counterclaim in Trial Court Civil No. 9489 which 
asserts the oft repeated theme of promised long term financing to 
Auto West (R-#9489-330). That claim is asserted by Real West only 
in Trial Court Civil No. 9489. The Appellant Bryan's general and 
punitive damage claims in Trial Court Civil No. 9489 involve 
nearly identical sums to those he claims in his own separate suit 
against Respondent case in Trial Court Civil No. 9478. Compare 
R-#9489-334 with R-#9489-122. 
Claims may not be split. In Anderson v. Oregon Short 
Line R.R. Co., 47 Utah 614, 155 P. 446, 448 (1916), the Utah 
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Supreme Court said that ". . . [i]t is quite elementary" that a 
single claim may not "be split up into a number of actions." In 
another decision, the Court observed: 
•The plaintiff, having no legal right to split 
her cause of action, the court by its judgment 
could not legally grant such right, if, in fact, 
it so intended.' 
Dawson v. Board of Education, 118 Utah 452, 458, 222 P.2d 590, 593 
(Utah 1950)(quoting Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., 131 Okla 25, 
267 P. 641, 644 (1928)) . 
The purpose of the rule against claim splitting is to 
prevent a multiplicity of suits and the injustice and burden of 
defending against piecemeal claims. Raymer v. Hi-Line Transport, 
Inc., 15 Utah 2d 427, 429, 394 P.2d 383, 384 (Utah 1964). 
In addition, in the context of decisions involving res 
judicata, the Utah Supreme Court has defined the type of claim 
that cannot be split. The court objects to the relitigation of 
successive suits involving " . . . what is essentially a single and 
continuing controversy over the appropriate relief to give for a 
single wrong or a closely related group of wrongs." Bradshaw v. 
Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1981). Relitigation is not 
permitted even if the litigants present new theories or defenses. 
Id. See also Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 46, 376 P.2d 946, 
947-948 (Utah 1962). The prohibition against claim splitting 
requires a party to bring, in a single lawsuit, all claims related 
to ". . .a single wrong or a closely related group of wrongs." 
Bradshaw, supra. 627 P.2d at 531. 
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Real West and Appellant Bryan have split their respective 
claims and damages. They should not be permitted to multiply them 
in successive suits. The Trial Court properly determined that 
Real West and Bryan had split their claims (R-2570). That holding 
should be affirmed. 
B. Neither Appellants Bryan Nor Graff Has Standing, 
Individually/ To Assert Damages or Claims, Which, if They 
Existed At All, Would Belong to The Appellant Real West. 
In the counterclaim in Trial Court Civil No. 9489, 
Appellants Bryan and Graff asserted individual damage claims based 
upon alleged harm sustained by Real West. But the only 
transaction relevant to Trial Court Civil No. 9489 which those 
Appellants personally entered into with Respondent was the 
execution of their respective personal guaranties of the loan to 
Real West. All of the causes of action asserted in the Trial 
Court Civil No. 9489 Counterclaim are based upon transactions 
between Respondent and Real West. 
Neither Bryan nor Graff has personal standing to allege 
damages based on claims, which, if they existed at all, would 
belong to Real West. Both Bryan and Graff claim to be officers in 
Real West, (R-2779 at 4; 2780 at 9). Bryan does not claim to be a 
shareholder in Real West (R-2780 at 22) but Graff does. An 
officer or shareholder has no personal right to bring individual 
suit for alleged damages sustained by the corporation. Norman v. 
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979). In 
Norman the court explained that: 
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. . . [E]ven though a shareholder owns all, or 
practically all, of the stock in a corporation, 
such a fact does not authorize him to sue as an 
individual for a wrong done by a third party to 
the corporation. 
id. at 1031-1032. 
As guarantors, Appellants Bryan and Graff only have 
standing to assert their own claims arising out of their 
guaranties. A sister state's Supreme Court wrote: 
. . . [I]t is elementary that the rights of the 
guarantor as against the creditor are determined 
by the terms of the contract between them. 
American Bank of Commerce v. Covolo, 88 N.M. 405, 540 P.2d 1294, 
1297 (1975). Courts have limited guarantor recovery against a 
creditor to a nullification of the guaranty. The Alaska Supreme 
Court has held that while a guarantor can assert defenses of the 
debtor against a creditor, " . . . the guarantor's status entitles 
him only to . . . the defensive use of the principal's claim." 
Arctic Contractors, Inc. v. State, 573 P.2d 1385, 1387 (footnote 
5) (Alaska 1978). The Court added: 
Once the claim against the guarantor has been 
nullified by full set-off he no longer bears any 
risks or suffers any injury from the creditor's 
wrongdoing. Thus, affirmative recovery by the 
guarantor would exceed the scope of the surety 
relationship and would actually usurp claims 
belonging only to the principal. 
Id. See also Perfecting Service Co. v. Product Development and 
Sales Co., 259 N.C. 400, 131 SE 2d 9, 23 (1963). 
In none of their capacities as officers, shareholders, or 
guarantors of Real West do Bryan and Graff have individual 
standing to raise Real West's claims against Respondent. 
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C. Appellants' Claims in Trial Court Civil No. 9489, Which 
Allege an Improper Foreclosure Sale, Fail in the Absence 
of Evidence that the Sale Was Irregular. In Any Event, 
the Claim Grounded in Conversion Fails Because Real 
Property May Not be Converted. 
In the first and second causes of action of their 
Counterclaim in Civil No. 9489 the Appellants claim the 1982 
foreclosure sale was improper. The Appellants apparently contend 
that Respondent's bid at sale was for an amount less than the 
amount of an earlier 1978 appraisal of the property.6 
Appellants* Brief does not address the alleged wrongful 
sale claims asserted in their Trial Court Civil No. 9489 
counterclaim. The evidence earlier cited in Respondent's 
Statement of Facts in this Brief shows the existence of the debt, 
(R-2763 Ex "I"), the lien (R-2763 Ex "J"), default (R-1624), 
notices of default and sale (R-2749 Ex "6", "8") and a regularly 
held sale (R-2749 Ex "9"). As was the case in Trial Court Civil 
No. 10782, the Appellants have failed to rebut the presumption of 
regularity in a trustee's sale. Concepts, Inc., supra 743 P.2d at 
1159. The evidence sustains the presumption of validity. The 
trustee complied with the reguirements of Section 57-1-24 et seg. 
6The 1978 appraisal appraised not only the real property and 
water rights sold at the sale, but also included other additional 
properties which were not sold at the sale (R-2746 Ex "3"; 2780 at 
152-154, 197-198, 2763 Ex "0"). The 1978 appraisal values the 
land and water which was sold at the 1982 sale at $120,145.00. 
Just prior to the 1982 sale Respondent had the real property and 
water rights appraised which were to be sold. That appraisal 
indicated that the property which was to be sold had a fair market 
value of $80,300.00. 
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of the Utah Code Annotated. The sale should not be set aside. 
See Sorenson v. Beers, supra. 585 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah 1978). 
Inasmuch as neither real property nor water user claims evidencing 
water rights can be converted (see Point IIC, pp.22-24, infra) the 
second cause of action in the Appellants' Civil No. 9489 
counterclaim is deficient in any event. 
D. Appellants' Claim Asserting Misuse of Process is 
Insufficiently Pleaded, Unsupported by Evidence and Is 
Not Raised in the Docketing Statement. 
In their Brief, Appellants do not raise as an issue on 
appeal Respondent's purported misuse or abuse of legal process by 
recording its notice of default or by filing suit in Civil No. 
9489. In requesting the trustee to record the notice of default 
and in bringing its civil action for a deficiency judgment, 
Respondent simply availed itself of a proper legal procedure, 
which was used exclusively for its normally intended purposes 
(R-1627). 
The third cause of action in the Appellants' counterclaim 
alleging a misuse of process by Respondent is procedurally 
defective because it fails to asert that in recording the notice 
of default and in filing its complaint, Respondent perverted legal 
processes in order to achieve an improper purpose. See Crease v. 
Pleasant Grove City, 30 Utah 2d 451, 455, 519 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 
1974). Because of the deficiencies of pleading and proof with 
respect to the abuse of process cause of action in the Appellants 
Trial Court Civil No. 9489 such claim was properly dismissed by 
the Trial Court (R-2573). 
Bidders and That it Improperly Disclosed an Appraisal to 
Third Persons is Unsupported by the Evidence. 
Both the trustee and Respondent's officer have testified 
they did nothing to discourage or hinder third persons from 
bidding at the foreclosure sale (R-2749 at 34; 1625). Neither did 
they disclose the contents of the most recent appraisal to any 
third person potential bidder (R-2749 at 17; 1625). Appellants 
admit they have no evidence of any such interference or disclosure 
of appraisal documents (R-2771 at 100-101; 2782 at 22-23). 
Absent any evidence whatever of the allegations contained 
in the fourth cause of action in the Appellant Trial Court Civil 
No. 9489 counterclaim, the Trial Court properly dismissed the 
claim. (R-2570). That ruling should be affirmed by this Court. 
F. Appellants' Claim of Fraud in Trial Court Civil No. 9489 
is Without Evidence of Key Elements Necessary to Sustain 
a Fraud Claim. In Any Event, Fraud Cannot Be Sustained 
in Light of the Actual Facts in This Case. 
While Appellants* fraud claim in the fifth cause of 
action in their Trial Court Civil No. 9489 counterclaim involves a 
different loan transaction than the loan transaction relevant to 
the fraud claim in Bryan's Trial Court Civil No. 9478 
counterclaim. However, the dates, speakers of the alleged 
misrepresentations, and the alleged misrepresentations asserted 
are virtually identical. Compare (R-#9489-330-332) with 
(R-#9478-120-121) . Because of the very close interrelationship 
between the fraud arguments raised by Real West, Graff and Bryan 
in Trial Court Civil No. 9489 and those claimed by Bryan in Trial 
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Court Civil No. 9478, Respondent refers this court to its 
arguments made in Section III B5 of Respondent's Brief in the 
companion Auto West, Bryan and ULCC case, at pages 41-44, 
Without repeating points made in the companion brief, the 
following additional points should be made with respect to 
Appellants' fraud arguments in this case. 
The representations which Appellants claim were made in 
1980 and 1981 could only have been made after the December 31, 
1979 date of the Note. Therefore, such alleged representations 
could not have been the basis of any Real West reliance in the 
signing of the Note (R-2763 Ex "I"). Respondent's purported 
misrepresentation in March of 1979 (R-#9489-329) would have been 
made at least eight months prior to the date of the Note. And 
Real West itself would have parted with nothing of value on 
account of any Spring, 1979, representation by Respondent. 
While Real West claims that in December, 1979, Respondent 
promised long term financing to Auto West (R-#9489-330), and that 
as a result of that representation Real West was induced to sign 
the Note and Trust Deed (R-#9489-331), nothing in either the Note 
or the Trust Deed refers to any loan to Auto West as a repayment 
source of Real West's Note (R-2763 Ex "I", "J"). Rather, Real 
West, and Real West alone, promised to repay the Note. (R-2763 Ex 
"I"). Even if there had been prior discussions about long term 
financing to Auto West, Real West's execution of the final loan 
documents was the final embodiment of the actual agreement between 
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it and the bank. Prior negotiations or contents of earlier 
discussions would have merged into the final contract. Verhoef v. 
Aston, 740 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Most damaging of all to Real West's fraud claim, however, 
is the testimony of its officers that when the 1979 
representations were purportedly made, Real West's officer 
believes that the bank employees intended to grant the purported 
long term loan to Auto West. 
The following colloquy appears in one of Mr. Bryan's 
depositions: 
Question: . . . Do you believe that at the time Mr. 
Miller [Respondent's loan officer] purportedly 
made a commitment for long-term financing, that 
at that time, he had an intent to perform.. 
Answer: Most assuredly. I believe that he had an 
intent to perform, and believe that he and that 
Francis Beteson [Mr. Miller's supervisor and 
another officer of respondent] had the intent 
to perform. And I believe that Francis Beteson 
intended for Max Miller to perform on it. 
(R-2771 at 111). See also Id. at 112. And ^ee R-2754 at 65. 
There is no evidence that at the time of the execution of 
Real West's Note, Respondent had any fraudulent intent insofar as 
any of the Appellants are concerned. The purported statement was 
one made .in futuro (R-#9489-330-331) . There is no evidence that 
if the purported statement were made the speaker or speakers had 
any then present intention not to perform. Absent such an 
intention, a claim for purported fraud involving a statement of a 
future event cannot be sustained. Cerritos Trucking Company v. 
Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 612 (Utah 1982),. And, neither 
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Bryan nor Graff has individual standing to step into Real West's 
position in asserting the alleged fraud. Norman, supra 596 P.2d 
1031-1032. The ruling of the lower court dismissing Appellants' 
fraud claim in this matter should be affirmed (R-2573). 
G. Appellants' Claim Asserting That Respondent Fraudulently 
Caused the State Water Engineer's Office to Transfer 
Title to the Water Rights is Unsupported by the Evidence. 
The eighth cause of action in Appellants* Trial Court 
Civil No. 9489 Counterclaim recites: 
During the year of 1983, agents of counter-
defendant [i.e. Respondent] falsely and/or 
fraudulently caused the Utah State Engineer's 
office to transfer title of all Real West, Inc.'s 
water rights, claims and applications for water 
rights to the name of counterdefendant. 
(R-#9489-333). No evidence supports Appellants' contentions. 
Respondent assumed it had marketable title to the water 
rights on account of the trustee's deed it received after the sale 
(R-1626). There is, however, no indication that Respondent 
falsely or fraudulently caused the Area Water Engineer to transfer 
record title to the water rights. Sandra McCall, a Water Rights 
Specialist employed by the Area Water Engineer, testified that 
either she or her secretary crossed out the original applicant's 
name and wrote in by hand the name of Respondent. Respondent did 
not instruct her to make those changes. She made the changes 
based upon the content of records in her office. See (R-2747 at 
33-34). There is thus no factual basis for the allegations in 
Appellants' eighth cause of action in the Trial Court Civil 
No. 9489 Counterclaim. 
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IV. APPELLANTS' CLAIM ASSERTING A BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD 
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING CANNOT BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE IT WAS 
NOT PROPERLY RAISED, IN ANY EVENT THE PURPORTED ORAL 
CONTRACT APPELLANTS ASSERT IS AT VARIANCE WITH THE TERMS 
OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
In Section III Bl-4, pages 35-41 of its companion 
memorandum in The Auto West, Bryan and ULCC cases, Respondent has 
made its argument that the Appellants * claim alleging a breach of 
covenant of good faith was never brought before the lower court in 
a proper procedural posture. Respondent refers the Court to those 
arguments. Since no stipulation or order authorized that 
amendment, Appellants failed to comply with the requirement of 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Even if the breach of covenant of good faith issue had 
been properly pleaded and timely raised, the claim is unsupported 
by evidence or law. The loan contract between the Respondent and 
Real West was wholly written. It consisted of the Note and Trust 
Deed. When Real West failed to pay the note at maturity, the Note 
became in default. The Trust Deed provided that in the event of 
default the property could be sold by the trustee. The 
foreclosure sale was held in accordance with Utah statutory law. 
The guaranties of the Appellants Bryan and Graff were 
also in writing. 
The applicable legal principles have been succinctly 
described by the Utah Supreme Court: 
c . . The parties to a contract must deal fairly 
and honestly with each other . . . [citation 
omitted]. A court will not, however, make a 
better contract for the parties than they have 
made for themselves [citation omitted]. An 
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express agreement or covenant relating to a 
specific contract right excludes the possibility 
of an implied covenant of a different or 
contradictory nature [citation omitted] . . . A 
duty of good faith does not mean that a party 
vested with a clear right is obligated to 
exercise that right to its own detriment for the 
purpose of benefitting another party to the 
contract. A court will not enforce asserted 
rights that are not supported by the contract 
itself. 
Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 
1980)(emphasis added). 
In the two Real West cases involved in this appeal, 
Appellants claim Respondent breached a covenant of good faith by: 
(a) having the collateral sold at foreclosure sale; and/or (b) by 
failing to pay off the Note to Real West with the proceeds of the 
alleged long term loan to Auto West. 
As to the former argument, the collateral was sold only 
when Real West failed to timely repay its Note and to cure its 
default. The contract documents specifically provided for the 
legal remedy of nonjudicial foreclosure (R-2763 Ex "I", "J"). The 
fact of default is evident (R-1624). The sale complied with all 
legal requirements. Respondent breached no duty of good faith by 
having the collateral sold after Real West failed to cure the 
default on its Note. 
As to the second contention, the loan documents 
specifically provided that Real West, and Real West alone, had the 
obligation to repay (R-2763 Ex "I", -J"). There is no writing or 
other contract which indicates Auto West agreed to or intended to 
repay Real West's Note. Real West's assertion that Auto West was 
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to pay off the Note with proceeds of its purported long term loan 
from Respondent is supported by none of the written contract 
documents. The actual contract documents between Real West and 
Respondent are to the contrary (R-2763 Ex "I", "J"). Real West 
asks this court to enforce a nonexistent contract which Real West 
wishes it had with Respondent or Auto West. But there is no 
documentary evidence of such an agreement. And the court may not 
create a contract with terms which are different from the actual 
written agreement between the parties. See Rio Algom, supra, 618 
P.2d at 505. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Respondent seeks to have this Court affirm all of the 
final orders and judgments of the Trial Court in Trial Court Civil 
Nos. 9489 and 10782. All other findings contained in the Trial 
Court Memorandum Decision should also be affirmed,, 
Respectfully submitted this \Lf^ day of June, 1989. 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Thomas M. Higbee 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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P.O. Box 726 
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APPENDIX "A" 
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
RAISED IN TRIAL COURT CIVIL NO. 94 89 
(APPELLANTS REAL WEST, GRAFF & STEPHENS) 
A. CLAIMS ASSERTED BY APPELLANTS 
Nature of Claim 
1. First Cause of Action - wrongful 
foreclosure sale (failure of Bank to bid 
amount of old appraisal). 
2. Second Cause of Action - wrongful 
foreclosure sale (alleged conversion of 
real property). 
3. Third Cause of Action - abuse 
of process. 
4. Fourth Cause of Action -
interference with bidders and sale. 
5. Fifth Cause of Action - fraud. 
6. Sixth Cause of Action - slander 
of title on account of wrongful foreclosure, 
7. Seventh Cause of Action - false, 
fraudulent and improper foreclosure sale. 
8. Eighth Cause of Action - fraudulent 
or false attempt to have State Engineer's 
Office transfer title. 
9. Ninth Cause of Action - unspecified 
theory alleging general damages. 
10. Untimely plead assertion of breach 
of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 











B. RESPONDENT'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE RULED UPON BY TRIAL COURT, 
Nature of Defense Ruling of Trial Court 
1. Laches (on claims asserting Sustained 
wrongful sale). 
A-l 
2. Failure to Tender Past Due Sustained 
Sums (on claims asserting wrongful 
foreclosure). 
3. Failure to Plead or Prove Sustained 
Material Elements of Claims. 
4. Compliance with Statutory Sustained 
Procedures and Unrebutted Presumption of 
Regularity (on claims asserting wrongful 
foreclosure)• 
5. Claim Splitting (on causes of Sustained 
action plead in other consolidated cases). 
6. Lack of Standing for Individual Sustained 




SUMMARY OF CLAIMS AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
RAISED IN TRIAL COURT CIVIL NO. 10782 
(REAL WEST) 
A. CLAIMS ASSERTED BY APPELLANT REAL WEST IN ITS AMMENDED COMPLAINT 
Nature of Claim Ruling of Trial Court 
1. First Cause of Action - Slander Claim Dismissed 
of title to water rights, 
2. Second Cause of Action - quieting Claim Dismissed 
title to water right in favor of Real West. 
3. Third Cause of Action - conversion Claim Dismissed 
of water rights. 
4. Fourth Cause of Action - Claim Dismissed 
conversion of real property. 
5. Fifth Cause of Action - quieting Claim Dismissed 
title of real property in favor of insofar as Respondent 
Real West. is concerned 
6. Sixth Cause of Action - conversion Reserved for Trial 
of sum of $7,000 in escrow account. 
7. Untimely Raised Claim of Breach Claim Dismissed 
of Covenant of Good Faith. 
B. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF RESPONDENT 
1. Failure to Plead or Prove Sustained 
Necessary Elements of Claims. 
2. Sale Complied With Statutory Sustained 
Requirements and Unrebutted Presumption 
of Regularity of Sale. 
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